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 Waiting in long lines discourages some people from voting, undermines confidence in the 
electoral system, and imposes economic costs on voters. 
o Estimates of lost votes due to long lines in 2012 range from 500,000 to 700,000. 
o Voters who wait in long lines are less confident their votes are counted as intended, 
and that votes nationwide are counted as intended.   
o Long lines affect the confident of voters in states with long lines, even when 
individuals do not experience the long lines themselves. 
o The economic cost to voters of standing in line to vote is approximately $500 million. 
 
 Waiting in long lines was not universal in 2012. 
o Average wait times ranged from 2 minutes in Vermont to 39 minutes in Florida. 
o Wait times in states and counties were consistent with patterns in 2008. 
o There was significant variation in wait times within states, and even within counties. 
o Minority voters, early voters, and urban dwellers experienced the longest lines. 
 
 Most standard recommendations for shortening lines derive from simple, straightforward 
application of queuing theory. 
o These recommendations revolve around reducing the number of in-person voters, 
increasing service points, and decreasing transaction times. 
o There is little empirical evidence that the recommendations prescribed as solutions to 
long lines have actually been effective in reducing waiting times. 
o Budgetary and space constraints weigh heavily in implementing reforms to reduce 
lines. 
 
 Unlike the response to the “lost votes” that beset the 2000 presidential election, there are no 
easily implemented reforms that have been demonstrated to be effective through systematic 
study. 
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Waiting in line to vote is the most visible sign of the administrative friction of managing 
elections. 
 
The visibility of long lines makes them a convenient symbol for those who seek to improve 
election administration.  However, absent comprehensive, reliable information about lines — 
where they appear, who endures them, and strategies to mitigate them — it is easy to flail at the 
problem without making much progress.  The purpose of this white paper is to lay the 
groundwork with some evidence about where long lines occur and what is thought to cause them.  
The major points are these: 
 
 Long lines are costly.  Not only does waiting impose a monetary cost on voters, it 
discourages some from voting altogether, and ultimately undermines the confidence that 
citizens have in the electoral process. 
 
 Long lines are not universal.  They are concentrated in a handful of states.  Racial 
minorities tend to wait to vote longer than white voters; city dweller wait longer than 
suburbanites and rural residents. 
 
 The scientific field of queuing theory can help frame thinking about polling place lines.  
This theory helps to clarify the possible causes of inordinately long lines, and suggests 
strategies for improvements. 
 
 The research on the effectiveness of strategies to mitigate long lines at the polls is thin.  
Unlike the problem with voting machines unearthed following the 2000 election, the 
literature provides no “magic bullets” that can be immediately applied to polling places in 
time to dramatically improve the voting experience by the 2016 presidential election. 
 
 
The Costs of Lines 
 
Long lines at the polling place are often taken to be a sign that something is wrong.  This need 
not always be the case.  Lines can also be viewed as a sign that the public is excited by an 
election or the candidates.  This alternative interpretation of lines is often associated with 
elections in emerging democracies, as the following Associated Press report from the 2005 Iraq 
general election suggests: 
                                                 
1 Stewart is Kenan Sahin Distinguished Professor of Political Science at MIT and co-director of the Caltech/MIT 
Voting Technology Project.  Contact e-mail:  cstewart@mit.edu.  Ansolabehere is Professor of Government at 
Harvard University.  Contact e-mail: sda@gov.harvard.edu. Research assistance was provided by James Dunham.   
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BAGHDAD -- Iraqis embraced democracy in large numbers Sunday, standing in 
long lines to vote in defiance of mortar attacks, suicide bombers and boycott calls. 
Pushed in wheelchairs or carts if they couldn't walk, the elderly, the young and 
women in veils cast ballots in Iraq's first free election in a half-century. . . .  "I am 
doing this because I love my country, and I love the sons of my nation," said 
Shamal Hekeib, 53, who walked with his wife 20 minutes to a polling station near 
his Baghdad home.2 
 
The American electoral context is certainly less dire than that in countries such as Iraq.  
Still, considering the fact that long lines are sometimes used as an indicator of citizen 
confidence in democracy, we should provide evidence of the alternative view.  Here, we 
provide evidence about three ways in which long lines may be regarded as a problem in 
American elections:  they may discourage voting, lower voter confidence, and impose 
economic costs on voters. 
 
 
Long lines may discourage voting. 
 
Long lines may discourage some from voting, thus undermining the quality of elections 
as an expression of the people’s will.  Still, an important question needs to be addressed 
up front:  when is a line to vote “too long”?   
 
We could answer this question one of two ways.  First, we could observe actual lines, 
noting the point at which newly arriving voters decide not to join the line (“balking” in 
the language of queuing theory) — or how long people waited in line until they left 
(“reneging”).  Few studies have addressed this question directly, and none at the national 
level, so it is not possible to estimate the size of the deterrent effect of long lines in 
presidential elections.3 
 
An indirect way to answer this question is via survey research.  In November 2008, right 
before the presidential election, the Marist poll asked of 716 adults, “What is the longest 
amount of time, in minutes, that you would wait on line to vote?”  Here, 41% responded 
“as long as it takes,” with 27% answering “30 minutes or less,” 17% “31 to 60 minutes,” 
and 15% “more than an hour.” 
 
Because “as long as it takes” is a socially desirable response, it is likely that the 
willingness of voters to wait in line is less than what is reflected here.  However, even if 
we take the responses to the Marist poll at face value, a significant fraction of voters are 
unwilling to wait as long as it takes to vote.  This suggests that the prospect of long lines 
                                                 
2 Sally Buzbee, “In Iraq, long lines, much joy and violence and uncertainty,” Associated Press, Jan. 31, 2005, 
accessed via LexisNexis Academic. 
3 The best published research in this regard was by Spencer and Markovits, who collected data during the 2008 
presidential primary in California by observing 30 polling stations across three counties.  They discovered a positive 
correlation between the number of people standing in line and the probability of someone in line reneging.  See 
Douglas M Spencer and Zachary S Markovits, "Long Lines at Polling Stations? Observations from an Election Day 
Field Study," Election Law Journal 9, no. 1 (2010). 
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can serve as a deterrent to some voters turning out — precisely which voters these may 
be is still an open question. 
  
Other survey research studies provide us with estimates of how many people did not vote 
because of long lines.  Responses to the 2012 Voting and Registration Supplement (VRS) 
of the Current Population Survey suggest that over 500,000 eligible voters failed to vote 
because of a list of polling place problems that include long lines — inconvenient hours 
or polling place location, or lines too long.  On the other hand, among non-voting 
respondents to the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), 0.8% stated 
that the main reason they did not vote was that “lines at the polls were too long.”  If we 
apply this percentage to the 91.6 million eligible voters who failed to vote in 2012,4 we 
calculate that there were 730,000 non-voters due to long lines in the most recent federal 
election.5 
 
 
Long lines can reduce voter confidence in elections. 
 
While long lines can cause voters to be turned away at the polls, the greater effect is on 
those who turn out to vote.  Responses to the SPAE suggest that waiting a long time to 
vote reduces the confidence voters have that their votes are counted.  For instance, among 
Election Day voters, 68% of those who waited ten minutes or less to vote stated they 
were very confident their vote was counted as intended, compared to 47% of voters who 
waited over an hour.6  For early voters, the difference in confidence was only slightly 
less:  69% of those waiting ten minutes or less were very confident, compared to 54% 
who waited an hour or more. 
 
What is more, the experience of waiting in a long line influences the judgments that form 
in voters’ minds about the quality of vote counting throughout the nation.  The following 
table reports the percentage of voters who were very confident that votes were counted as 
intended in their county, state, and nationwide, as a function of how long they waited to 
vote.  Among Election Day voters who waited 10 minutes or less, 68% were very 
confident their own vote was counted as intended, 56% were very confident that votes 
throughout their county were counted as intended, etc.7 
 
                                                 
4 Turnout and data about eligible voters was obtained at the web site of the United States Elections Project, 
http://elections.gmu.edu. 
5 There are no statistically significant differences along race, income, or education among those citing long lines as 
the reason for not voting in the 2012 CCES. 
6 Research by Sances and Stewart, among others, has shown that the most important influence on answers to the 
question about whether one’s vote was counted as intended is the partisanship of the respondent — respondents who 
voted for the winning candidate are generally more confident their vote was counted properly than those who voted 
for the losing candidate.  See Michael Sances and Charles Stewart, III, "Partisanship and Voter Confidence, 2000-
2010," in MIT Political Science Department Working Papers (2012).  In a multivariate statistical analysis that adds 
controls for partisanship and state of residence of the voter, the relationship reported here, between voter confidence 
and wait times, remains. 
7 With the exception of the last cell entry — attitudes among early voters about whether votes nationwide were 
counted as intended — the differences reported in Table 1 remain once we control statistically for the party 
identification of the respondent and the respondent’s home state. 
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Finally, the existence of long lines influences assessments made about the accuracy of 
vote counting even among those who do not experience long lines.  Consider, for 
instance, individual voters who live in states with long average wait times, but who did 
not experience long lines themselves.  Among voters who live in the five states with the 
longest average wait times in 20128 but who reported that they, themselves, did not have 
to wait at all to vote, 23% said they were very confident that votes in their state were 
counted as intended.  This compares to similarly-situated voters in the five states with the 
shortest average wait times, 63% of whom were very confident that votes in their state 
were counted as intended.9 
 
 
Long lines impose monetary costs on voters. 
 
Finally, there are monetary costs to waiting in line to vote.  Even if these costs are 
regarded by voters and by society as a reasonable price to pay for exercising the 
franchise, and even if voters receive paid time off to vote, time spent waiting to vote 
represents the lost opportunity of voters to engage in productive work or leisure time 
activities.  If costly solutions are proposed to reduce waiting times, it would be useful to 
have an estimate of what waiting in line to vote costs Americans in economic terms. 
 
We are aware of no published analysis that attempts to place an economic value on the 
time that Americans spend waiting to vote.  A simple way to produce a ballpark estimate 
is to multiply the total number of hours waiting in line by average hourly earnings.  
Based on an average wait time in 2012 of 13.1 minutes as reported below and an estimate 
that 105.2 million people voted in-person in 2012 (either on Election Day or in early 
voting), we calculate that voters spent a total of 23.0 million hours waiting to vote in 
2012.10  According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, average hourly earnings were 
                                                 
8 These states were Florida, the District of Columbia, Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia.  Oregon and 
Washington are excluded from this analysis, because so few voters in those states vote in-person. 
9 These findings remain in a multivariate statistical model in which we control for the party identification of the 
respondent. 
10 The in-person turnout estimate starts with Professor Michael McDonald’s 2012 turnout estimate of 129.1 million.  
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2012G.html.  Using the 2012 Voter Registration Supplement of the CPS, we can 
estimate that 81.5% of voters voted in-person.  Multiplying the turnout estimate by the estimate of the rate of in-
person voting yields 105.2 million. 
Table 1.  Percentage of respondents very confident that votes were counted as 
intended in the 2012 election. 
 Election Day voters  Early voters 
 Waited 10 
minutes or less 
Waited an 
hour or more 
 Waited 10 
minutes or less 
Waited an 
hour or more 
Their own vote 68% 47%  69% 54% 
Votes in their county 56% 32%  57% 48% 
Votes in their state 46% 23%  43% 34% 
Votes nationwide 24% 13%  23% 21% 
Source:  SPAE, 2012 
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$23.67 in November 2012.  Multiplying the number of hours waiting to vote by average 
hourly earnings yields an economic cost estimate of $544.4 million.   
 
We have no opinion about whether this amount is “too high,” “too low,” or “just right.”  
However, it is of a similar magnitude to previous estimates about the annual costs of 
administering elections in the U.S.  For instance, in 2001 the Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project estimated that local governments spent about $1 billion conducting 
and administering elections in 2000.11  If we combine the estimated costs borne by local 
governments conducting elections with the economic cost of waiting in line, a significant 
fraction of the economic cost of conducting a presidential election is the time spent by 
voters waiting in line.   
 
To summarize, long lines at the polls impose real costs, economic and otherwise, though 
it is important to keep those costs in perspective.  Long lines reduce turnout by a small 
amount; the bigger practical effect is the inconvenience imposed on those who do turn 
out to vote, an inconvenience that is not uniformly borne by all voters.  Not only are 
some voters inconvenienced by long lines, but the existence of long lines undermines 
confidence in the electoral system, even among those who do not encounter lines 
themselves. 
 
 
Basic Facts about Lines 
 
To help focus attention on the distribution of long lines in the United States, we turn our 
attention to the evidence we can adduce about who waits in line, and how long they wait, by 
using answers to two major academic surveys, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES) and the Survey of the Performance of American Elections (SPAE).12 
 
Relying on responses to the 2008 and 2012 CCES, the following table reports the distribution of 
responses to the question, “Approximately, how long did you have to wait in line to vote?”   
 
                                                 
11 Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is/What Could Be (Pasadena, Calif. and Cambridge., 
Mass.: Caltech and MIT, 2001). 
12 Ansolabehere and Stewart are the principal investigators of the CCES and SPAE, respectively.  Both are Internet 
surveys and both ask an identical question concerning the amount of time voters waited at the polls.  In 2012, the 
CCES interviewed 54,535 adults, 39,675 of whom voted; the SPAE interviewed 10,200 registered voters, 9,336 of 
whom voted.  The CCES asks fewer questions about election administration, but has a larger sample size that is 
distributed across the nation in proportion to population.  The SPAE focuses its questions entirely on election 
administration, with a smaller sample size distributed within states in proportion to population.  Depending on the 
nature of the analysis, one survey will be more appropriate to use than the other.  In some cases, specifically 
estimating waiting times within states, we can combine the two surveys to create more precise estimates. 
6 
 
 
 
Most voters in the past two general elections did not wait very long to vote.  Roughly one-third 
report not waiting at all, and roughly two-thirds report waiting ten minutes or less. 
 
It is important to note, though, that among those who wait more than one hour, the waits can be 
quite long.  Among those waiting more than an hour in these two presidential elections, the 
average reported wait time was 109 minutes in 2008 and 110 minutes in 2012.  Viewed another 
way, 31% of the total time waiting to vote in 2012 was endured by the 3.9% of voters who 
waited more than an hour to vote.  (In 2008, voters waiting more than an hour accounted for 40% 
of all time consumed in line.) 
 
By far, the longest lines occur in presidential elections.  The same waiting-in-line question has 
been asked in other studies sponsored either by the CCES or SPAE projects in recent years.  The 
answers allow us to gauge average waiting times in lower-turnout elections.  In the 2006 CCES, 
for instance, the average waiting time in that midterm federal election was 6.6 minutes.  In the 
2008 “Super Tuesday” presidential primaries, the average wait time was 3.9 minutes in the ten 
states that held a primary that day. 
 
As these statistics suggest, there is significant variation in the amount of time people wait to 
vote.  The variation is not distributed randomly among voters.  We first review the geographic 
distribution of lines, followed by demographic characteristics of voters who wait. 
 
 
The geography of waiting 
 
The factor that is associated with the biggest differences in wait times is the residence of the 
voter, in particular, the state where the voter lives.  According to estimates derived by combining 
responses to the CCES and SPAE, average wait times in 2012 ranged from 1.5 minutes in 
Vermont to 39.2 minutes in Florida — a difference of a factor of 26 between these two states.  
The table in Appendix 1 reports the state estimates, along with 95% margins of error.  The figure 
below displays the 2012 waiting times graphically. 
 
Table 2.  Average waiting times to vote, 2008 and 2012 
 2008 2012 
Not at all 36.8% 37.3% 
Less than 10 minutes 27.6% 31.8% 
10-30 minutes 19.0% 18.4% 
31-60 minutes 10.3% 8.6% 
More than one hour 6.3% 3.9% 
Average (min.) 16.7 13.3 
95% margin of error 
(min.) 
0.1 0.1 
N 18,836 30,124 
Source:  CCES, 2008 and 2012. 
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The following map helps to highlight the regions of the country where line length tends to be 
longer or shorter.  (Oregon and Washington, which primarily use vote-by-mail, are not shaded in 
this map.)  The shortest waiting times tend to occur in the western half of the country and in the 
northeast, while the longest waits tend to occur in the lower eastern seaboard. 
 
Figure 1. Average waiting times to vote, 2012 
Source: CCES and SPAE, 2012. 
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Waiting times also vary within states.  Consider two urbanized states that are toward the ends of 
the spectrum, New Jersey, with an average wait time of 5 minutes, and Florida, averaging 39 
minutes.  In New Jersey, average wait times ranged from 3.6 minutes in Gloucester County to 10 
minutes in Union County.13  In Florida, average estimated wait times range from 5.7 minutes in 
Marion County to 136.6 minutes in Lee County.14 
 
There is also variation within counties.  Unfortunately, it appears that very few local election 
officials systematically collect waiting times at the polls, and fewer still make those reports 
available to the public.  One exception, which allows us to catch a glimpse into local variation, is 
Broward County, Florida, which in 2012 posted regular updates about estimated waiting times at 
the 17 early voting sites in the county.  The following graph shows the average posted waiting 
times, for each day of the early voting period, for each early voting location.  The graphs in the 
figure are ordered according to the overall average wait time for each early voting site, ranging 
from 14 minutes at the Supervisor of Elections branch office at the E. Pat Larkins Community 
Center, to 2.6 hours at the Tamarac Branch Library.  The solid line in each graph plots the 
average posted wait time each day.  The horizontal dashed line shows the average across the 
entire early voting period. 
 
                                                 
13 These estimates take into account counties for which we have 25 or more observations per county. The 95% 
confidence intervals are 1.6 minutes for Gloucester and 4.5 for Union. 
14 The 95% confidence intervals are 1.6 minutes for Marion County and 11.4 minutes for Lee County. 
Figure 2. Average waiting times to vote, 2012 
 
Source: CCES and SPAE, 2012. 
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The great variation across states suggests there are state-specific factors, such as laws, 
regulations, and state norms, which influence how long voters wait to vote.  The great variation 
within states suggests that there is further influence of demographics and local administrative 
practices in determining line lengths at the polls. 
 
Waiting times vary across all levels of geography, ranging from the state level to the level of the 
particular polling place.  Why we have such geographic variation remains largely a matter of 
speculation.  As we show below, demographics explain some of these differences.  However, 
demographics are insufficient to explain why the average Floridian waits 26 times longer to vote 
than the average Vermonter, or why the average early voter at the Tamarac Branch Library waits 
three times longer than the average early voter at the E. Pat Larkins Community Center. 
 
There is one final topic to be visited under the heading of the geography of waiting:  the 
persistence of waiting times from one election to the next.  When we compare the estimated 
average wait times at the state level in 2012 with 2008, we see remarkable consistency, which is 
illustrated in the following graph.  In Figure 4, we plot the average wait time by state in 2012 
along the y-axis, and the 2008 average along the x-axis.  (The axis scales are logarithmic, which 
aids in the legibility of the individual data points.)  The diagonal line helps to orient us and 
Figure 3. Average waiting time, Broward County, Florida early voting sites, 2012. 
 
Source:  Broward County, Florida Supervisor of Elections Web site. 
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inform us which states showed increases in wait time in 2012, compared to 2008 (above the 
line), and which showed decreases (below the line). 
 
 
 
States with long wait times in 2012 generally had long wait times in 2008.  There are certainly 
some exceptions.  Still, if one wanted to predict which states would have long wait times in 
2012, the best place to start would be to identify those states with long wait times in 2008. 
 
This observation is important for thinking about how to tackle the problem of long lines.  In the 
wake of the long lines in 2012, many commentators and election officials pointed out factors that 
were unique to the 2012 election as the causes.  The best example is Florida, which saw 
significant changes in its election law which, in hindsight, seem ripe to have caused longer lines 
at the polls.  (Some of these changes include cutting the early voting period significantly and 
lengthening the text on the ballot to describe referenda.)  While such one-off events may have 
increased waiting times on the margin, they often were building off of waiting times that were 
long to begin with.  To be effective in tackling the problem of long lines at the polls, it is 
important to understand both the long-term and short-term factors that lead to them, which may 
be distinct. 
 
 
Figure 4. Average wait time at the state level, 2012 and 2008. 
 
Source:  CCES and SPAE, 2012.
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The demography of waiting 
 
Not only are wait times unevenly distributed geographically, they are unevenly distributed 
demographically, as the following statistics, drawn from the CCES, illustrate: 
 
1. Mode of voting.  Early voters in 2012 waited an average of 18 minutes, compared to 12 
minutes for Election Day voters.15 
 
2. Race of voters.  Minority voters waited longer to vote than white voters.  The following 
table reports the average wait times for the different racial groups recorded in the CCES.  
White voters waited an average of 12 minutes to vote, compared to 24 minutes for 
African American voters and 19 minutes for Hispanic voters.  These differences largely 
remain when we control for the state of residence and mode of voting (Election Day vs. 
early voting).16 
 
 
 
3. Population density.  Voters in densely populated neighborhoods wait longer to vote than 
voters from sparsely populated areas.  Respondents to the CCES who lived in the least 
densely populated ZIP Codes waited an average of 6 minutes to vote, compared to 18 
minutes for residents of the most densely populated ZIP Codes.17 
 
It is not the case that all socially relevant demographics are correlated with the waiting time of 
voters.  For instance, there was little, if any, relationship between the household income and the 
length of time voters waited to vote.  Voters from families with household incomes of less than 
$30,000 waited an average of 12 minutes to vote, compared to 14 minutes for voters from 
families with incomes greater than $100,000.  This difference is statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
15 This difference remains when we control for the state in which the respondent lives. 
16 Before controlling for state of residence and mode of voting, the average wait time for African Americans is 12 
minutes greater than that of whites; the average wait time for Hispanics is 7 minutes greater.  After controlling, the 
differences are 9 and 7 minutes, respectively. 
17 This analysis was performed, first, by merging population density data to the CCES, using ZIP Code, and then 
dividing the sample into equally populated quarters, or quartiles.  Respondents from the least densely populated 
areas lived in ZIP Codes with a population density of 75 persons per square mile or less.  Residents from the most 
densely populated areas lived in ZIP Codes with a population density of 2,739 persons per square mile or more. 
Table 3. Average wait time by racial groups, 2012 
Race Avg. 
95% margin 
of error 
White 11.6 0.3 
Black 23.3 1.6 
Hispanic 18.7 2.2 
Asian 15.4 3.0 
Native American 13.3 3.2 
Mixed 13.6 2.0 
Other 13.3 2.0 
Middle Eastern 11.7 6.0 
Source:  CCES, 2012 
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Combining geography and demography 
 
The geographic and demographic factors discussed here that predict longer wait times are 
interrelated.  For instance, African Americans are more likely than whites to live in urban areas, 
and are more likely to vote early.  Each of these factors considered in isolation — being African 
American, living in an urban area, and voting early — is associated with longer waiting times.  
How do we assess these competing factors when they are clearly confounding each other?  The 
standard way to distinguish between factors that are confounded in this way is through 
multivariate statistical analysis, such as multiple regression.   
 
In Appendix 2, we have reported the results of such an analysis, in which the waiting time of 
individual respondents to the CCES are analyzed in terms of voting mode, race, and ZIP Code 
population density.  The analysis begins with a simple multiple regression, and then adds 
geography as a control through a technique known as “fixed effects regression.” 
 
Avoiding a technical discussion of the statistical results reported in Appendix 2, the following 
points emerge from the analysis: 
 
 The simple multivariate analysis shows that the differences in wait times between Blacks 
and Hispanics, on the one hand, and whites, on the other, hold up even once we account 
for differences in how different racial groups tend to vote in-person (on Election Day or 
early) and differences in the types of communities members of racial groups tend to live 
in (cities vs. rural areas). 
 
 The fixed effects analysis shows that as we control for the residence of the respondent at 
a finer and finer level (from state to county to ZIP Code), differences between whites and 
Blacks decline consistently, to the point that when we control for location of residence at 
the county level, the difference between whites and blacks is cut in half, compared to the 
difference that is observed before we start doing statistical analysis. 
 
This analysis suggests that minority voters do not tend to wait longer than white voters because 
of discrimination at the polls against individuals.  Rather, the neighborhoods that have high 
minority populations tend to experience long waiting times for all voters in that neighborhood, 
regardless of the race of individual voters.  Whites who live in racially diverse ZIP Codes wait to 
vote longer than whites who live in all-white neighborhoods; African Americans who live in 
predominantly white neighborhoods stand in shorter lines than African Americans who live in 
more diverse neighborhoods. 
 
Based on a thorough review of the literature, there does not appear to be any easy explanation for 
why neighborhoods with large African American populations tend to be subjected to longer 
lines.  It seems unlikely to be because of widespread concerted efforts to lengthen waiting times 
in minority communities for partisan gains, since the local governments of most of these 
communities are controlled by Democrats.  In all likelihood, longer waiting times in minority 
13 
 
communities are part of a larger pattern of government service maldistribution, of which election 
administration is just one piece. 
 
 
Queuing Theory and Election Lines 
 
The discussion of polling place lines up to this point has been cast at a very high degree of 
aggregation.  However, the lines themselves occur on the ground, in particular polling places.  It 
is quite possible for the wait at one precinct on Election Day to be more than an hour, while the 
wait at the neighboring precinct is less than ten minutes.  Ultimately, the solution to long lines at 
the polls — in the places where they exist — will come through a better understanding of the 
particular factors that influence long lines at particular polling places. 
 
The scientific discipline that analyzes waiting in line to receive a service is queuing theory, 
taught at business schools throughout the country.18  In its simplest expression, queuing theory 
can be applied to the problem of long lines at the poll.  Unfortunately, very few professional 
students of queues, from academia or the business world, have attacked the issue of queuing in 
the context of elections.19  Therefore, the following comments are intended to help frame the 
problem of long polling place lines, and suggest the direction that such research could go if 
attended to by professionals in this area of specialization. 
 
To start with the most basic building blocks, consider a simple case where people walk up to a 
counter to receive some type of service (this can be to check out of a supermarket, ride an 
amusement park ride, or register to vote).  The setting can be summarized in the figure below, in 
which we have a population (of known or unknown size) that arrives to receive the service, 
stands in a queue, receives the service, and then departs. 
 
                                                 
18 A (relatively) accessible introduction to queuing theory may be found in Chapter 4 of the online version of 
Richard C. Larson and Amedeo R. Odoni, Urban Operations Research, Prentice-Hall, 1981, available at 
http://web.mit.edu/urban_or_book/www/book/chapter4/contents4.html. 
19   See Theodore Allen and Mikhail Bernshteyn, "Mitigating Voter Waiting Times," Chance 19, no. 4 (2006); 
Alexander S. Belenky and Richard C. Larson, "To Queue or Note to Queue?" http://www.orms-today.org/orms-6-
06/queues.html; William A Edelstein and Arthur D Edelstein, "Queuing and Elections: Long Lines, Dres and Paper 
Ballots," Proceedings of EVT/WOTE 2010 (2010); Ugbebor O Olabisi and Nwonye Chukwunoso, "Modeling and 
Analysis of the Queue Dynamics in the Nigerian Voting System," Open Operational Research Journal 6, no. 
(2012); Douglas A. Samuelson, Theodore T. Allen, and Mikhail Bernshteyn, "The Right Not to Wait" 
http://www.orms-today.org/orms-12-07/frvoting.html; M. Yang, M. J. Fry, and W. D. Kelton, "Are All Voting 
Queues Created Equal?," in Simulation Conference (WSC), Proceedings of the 2009 Winter (2009); Muer Yang and 
others, "The Call for Equity: Simulation-Optimization Models to Minimize the Range of Waiting Times," IIE 
Transactions (2012). 
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Using a simple set of mathematical tools, knowledge about the design of the system (e.g., how 
many service stations are in place) and assumptions or knowledge about inputs (e.g., how 
frequently new customers arrive), it is possible to predict ahead of time quantities such as the 
average wait in the queue, the average length of the queue, and the number of customers the 
system can handle in a given unit of time. 
 
It is a simple set-up like this that has motivated the two most direct applications of queuing 
theory to the issue of polling places — studies by Allen and Bernshteyn and by Edelstein and 
Edelstein that were previously cited.  These studies have provided an analysis of waiting times in 
Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio, in light of the allocation of equipment to precincts (Allen 
and Bernshteyn) and a method for allocating voting machines to precincts (Edelstein and 
Edelstein). 
 
Research papers such as these are just the start of the application of queuing theory to the field of 
election administration.  The reason it is just a start is that the actual complexity of even the 
simplest polling site is much greater than what was depicted in the figure above.  Most 
importantly, three major services are provided at each polling place, not one:  checking in 
(including verifying one’s identity and receiving the proper ballot), marking the ballot, and 
submitting the ballot for counting.  Thus, even at its simplest, the typical in-person voting station 
(either Election Day or early) should be described using a figure such as the one below, in which 
the issue is not managing one queue, but three related queues, in which departures from one feed 
the next.   
 
 
 
A fundamental observation that emerges from this figure is the potential cascading of problems 
“downstream.”  For instance, a delay in scanning ballots, which is part of submitting ballots at 
the end of the process, can produce a long line of people with marked ballots who wish to leave 
the polling place, but can’t.  This, in turn, can lead managers of the polling station to restrict 
Figure 5.  Simple queuing. 
 
Figure 6.  Queuing in a polling place. 
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access to check-in, to preserve order at the voting booths and the check-out tables.  Lines 
accumulate at the door, even though the bottleneck is at the end of the process.  Indeed, press 
reports of polling places with notoriously long lines have noted these cascading effects — such 
as voters waiting to scan in a large number of ballot cards after they had marked their ballots in 
south Florida counties in 2012 or voters waiting to gain access to electronic voting machines 
after they had checked in at the registration table. 
 
All things being equal, average wait times to check-in and average service times for the complete 
voting process will be reduced as more places are available for voters to check in, for them to 
mark their ballots, and for them to scan their ballots and leave.  Of course, as the figure above 
suggests, simply adding capacity at one of the three major services may have little-to-no effect 
on service time at the polling place, if the capacity at the other services is not complementary.  In 
other words, adding more voting machines to a polling place that has a registration check-in 
bottleneck will be unlikely to reduce waiting times much, if at all. 
 
In addition, all things being equal, service times will be shortened as the number of voters 
arriving at a polling place is decreased.  We will address the effectiveness of following this 
strategy in the next section.  For now, suffice it to say that there are two ways to implement a 
decrease in voters arriving at a polling place in the short term.  First, the number of voters 
assigned to a polling place can be reduced.  Second, voters can be removed from in-person 
voting, by having them vote by mail, or voters can be shifted from Election Day voting to in-
person early voting.  Whether such a strategy is effective depends heavily on the “all things 
being equal” (ceteris paribus) proviso.  For instance, encouraging more voters to use the mails at 
the same time as the number of precinct polling places are reduced may have no, or a negative, 
effect on waiting times, if the resources for handling the remaining in-person voters do not 
increase on a per-voter basis. 
 
 
Mitigating Long Lines 
 
All of the strategies to mitigate long lines can be thought of in terms of the simple queuing 
theory schematic sketched out above.  Leaving aside for the moment the issues of ensuring that 
the capacities within the specific polling place service points are properly balanced, and applying 
the ceteris paribus proviso, lines will be lowered if (1) the number of voters coming to a polling 
place is reduced, (2) the number of service points is increased, or (3) average transaction times 
are reduced.  The following categorize various policy proposals that have been put forward as 
means to improve the problem of line lengths under these topics, providing some comments 
about the empirical basis of many of the proposals.20 
 
Reduce the number of voters coming to the polling place 
 
 Increase opportunities to vote by mail, thus reducing the total number of people using all 
forms of in-person voting.  Assuming that personnel and equipment are not shifted away 
from the in-person voting sites, the remaining in-person voters would presumably be 
                                                 
20 These proposals draw heavily on Justin Levitt, "Means to Reduce Lines at the Polls,"  (Los Angeles, Calif.: 
Loyola Law School, 2012).  See the Levitt paper for a longer list of proposals than the one presented here. 
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processed more quickly.  At the macro level, the shift of voters away from in-person 
voting has not decreased wait times.  Indeed, there is a statistically significant negative 
correlation between the change in people voting in-person in 2012 (compared to 2008) 
and the change in average waiting times, measured at the state level.  (In other words, 
states that had relatively more people vote in-person in 2012 had a slight decrease in 
average wait times.) 
 
 Increase opportunities to vote early in-person, removing pressure from traditional 
precincts.  This is similar to the proposal discussed immediately above.  The empirical 
evidence that this has been effective is also weak.  For instance, a decline in the 
percentage of voters voting on Election Day between 2008 and 2012 at the state level is 
uncorrelated with a decline in average wait times on Election Day. 
 
 Make Election Day a holiday, allowing for arrival times to be smoothed out during the 
day at traditional polling places.  This proposal is aimed at the problem that Election Day 
experiences an early morning pre-work rush that is particularly inconvenient to voters.  In 
2012, according to responses to the SPAE, voters arriving on Election Day before 9:00 
a.m., who accounted for 24% of all Election Day voters, waited an average of 16 minutes 
to vote.  In comparison, those arriving after 9:00 a.m. waited an average of 10 minutes.21  
This is a popular reform.  Among SPAE respondents, 58% supported this reform, ranging 
from 40% in Iowa to 75% in the District of Columbia.22  Currently, no American state 
has an Election Day holiday, and the academic literature is mixed on whether Election 
Day holidays are associated with an increase in turnout in the countries that have them.23 
 
 
Increase the number of service points 
 
 Increase the number of precincts.  This would reduce the number of voters who need to 
be processed through each Election Day polling place.  Note that the trend in many states 
has been in the opposite direction, often in response to the decline in in-person voters.  
However, it may be that the decline in polling places is outpacing the decline in in-person 
voters.  For instance, the total number of Election Day voters in Florida declined by 7% 
from 2008 to 2012.24  Through the merger of precincts and the co-location of precincts in 
a single polling place, the number of precincts in Florida declined at a faster rate, by 11% 
(from 6,992 to 6,242), and the number of polling locations similarly declined by 12% 
                                                 
21 The survey results also suggest a much smaller surge between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., but it is much less intense 
and shorter-lived than the early morning rush.  (These comments, of course, reflect national patterns.  Local 
conditions will vary.) 
22 It should be noted that support for this proposal is strongly divided by party identification, being favored by 70% 
of Democrats, 57% of independents, and 44% of Republicans. 
23 Compare Mark N. Franklin, Electoral Participation, in Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global 
Perspective, Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.), Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1996 and Andre 
Blais, Louis Massicotte, and Agnieszka Dobrzynska, Why Is Turnout Higher in Some Countries than Others? 
Ottawa, Elections Canada, 1996. 
24 The data reported here were obtained from the Florida Division of Elections.  Upon examination of the recently 
released draft 2012 EAVS data, it is clear that a significant amount of data cleaning is needed before we can draw 
conclusions about the ratio of voters to polling places nationwide. 
17 
 
(from 5,598 to 4,928).  As a result, the average number of Election Day voters per 
precinct actually grew by 4% (from 552 to 576).25  Florida’s counties did increase the 
total number of early voting sites from 2008 to 2012, from 276 to 296, a 7% increase.   
Despite the fact that the number of early voters declined by 11% across the two elections, 
the total number of early voting days was reduced by six.  Thus, on a per-day basis, 
Florida’s early voting sites had to handle 46% more voters in 2012 than they did in 
2008.26   
 
 Increase the number of poll workers.  An increase in the number of poll workers would 
presumably provide the opportunity to increase the number of service points, especially 
at the check-in table, and provide redundant coverage in the event of a problem at the 
polls.  As an empirical matter, there is no correlation between the number of poll workers 
per voter, at the state level, and wait times, but that could be because the unit of analysis, 
the state, is too crude to pick up any relationship that does in fact exist.  An important 
caution about this proposal is offered by the research of Spencer and Markovits, cited 
above, who found a positive relationship between the length of lines in their study of 
northern California precincts and the number of people staffing the check-in tables.  
While the causality of the situation described by Spencer and Markovits is ambiguous 
(e.g., perhaps more workers were assigned to precincts known to be prone to lines), they 
note that when there were more poll workers assigned to a precinct, they tended to be 
deployed inefficiently.  Therefore, the issue may not be so much how many poll workers 
are assigned, but how they are organized. 
 
 Increase the number of machines.  The same intuition applies to this recommendation as 
to the one immediately above.  The same cautions also apply.  There is no correlation 
between the number of voting machines and waiting time at the state level, and the 
Spencer and Markovits research found no relationship between the number of privacy 
booths at the precincts they observed and waiting times.  Again, the issue may be more a 
matter of efficient deployment than a matter of numbers. 
 
 Favor paper balloting over DREs.  Although technologies are evolving all the time, there 
is evidence that voters who use electronic voting machines (DREs, for Direct Recording 
Electronic) take longer to vote than users of paper system.  Research by Stewart that 
examined reported waiting times in the 2008 presidential election showed that voters who 
used DREs waited an average of 4.4 minutes longer to vote, compared to a baseline 11.3 
minutes for users of optical scanners.27  The mechanism giving rise to these longer lines 
is unclear.  Two major factors are thought to be responsible.  First, voters who use DREs 
appear to be more likely to vote all races on a ballot, causing service time at the machine 
to lengthen.  Second, because of the high unit cost of DREs, compared to the unit cost of 
                                                 
25 The EAVS data does not record the number of scanners deployed to Election Day and early voting locations, so it 
is not possible to tell whether the consolidation of precincts was accompanied by a decrease in scanners available on 
Election Day at the polls.   
26 In 2008 early voting sites had to process an average of 689 voters per day.  That grew to 1,005 in 2012. 
27 Charles Stewart III, The Performance of Election Machines and the Decline of Residual Votes in the U.S., The 
Measure of American Elections, Barry C. Burden and Charles Stewart III (eds.), forthcoming.  Similar findings are 
reported by Paul S. Herrnson and others, "Exceeding Expectations? Determinants of Satisfaction with the Voting 
Process in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election.," Journal of Politics 75, no. 2 (2013). 
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privacy booths to mark paper ballots, local election offices that use DREs may find it 
more expensive to expand capacity in response to an anticipated surge in turnout. 
 
 
Reduce average transaction times 
 
 Increase information to voters.  Not knowing where to vote continues to be a problem for 
some voters; when voters show up at the wrong polling place, they slow down 
transactions at the registration table, as the error is caught and the voter (perhaps) 
redirected.  Not knowing for whom to vote ahead of time — or how to vote on 
complicated initiatives and referendums — can cause voters to occupy more time in the 
voting booths.  Local governments, often in partnership with information technology 
companies such as Google, have moved quickly to push more information about voter 
registration and ballot items onto the Internet, although no systematic studies have yet to 
be published that gauge their effectiveness.  It is not unreasonable to surmise, however, 
that one of the reasons why California’s average polling place wait times are so short, 
despite the state’s notoriously long ballots, is due to the comprehensive information 
booklets sent to voters ahead of each election. 
 
 Increase the functionality of electronic poll books.  Electronic poll books hold the 
promise to speed up the check-in process and lower error rates at precincts.  As of yet, 
however, there is no evidence that electronic poll books have cut down on waiting times.  
Further work to increase the functionality of electronic poll books, including more 
sophisticated search capabilities, holds the promise to cutting down waiting times. 
 
 Decrease the length of ballots.  The general trend in American elections over the past 
century has been the consolidation of elections onto a single day.  Whereas a century ago 
it was common for states to hold local, state, and federal elections on different days, 
today it is common for states to schedule elections at all levels of government on the 
same first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in even-numbered years.  This 
has the virtue of saving money — a topic that is increasingly prominent whenever a 
special election must be held to fill a vacancy — but it comes at the cost of lengthening 
the ballot, requiring voters who wish only to vote for president to wait for voters ahead of 
them to fill out ballots for state and local races.  Furthermore, long, legalistic text 
associated with ballot questions can slow down voters who are unfamiliar with the issues 
being voted on or, as was demonstrated in Florida in 2012, require the use of multiple 
ballot cards, each of which must be separately scanned for the voter to check out.  
Finally, ballots that disregard best-practices in the field of graphic design — which may 
describe most ballots used by voters — slow down the process.  Overall, better attention 
to factors that cause ballots to grow in size could reduce the time it takes voters to mark 
their ballots.28 
 
                                                 
28 A recently published article by Herrnson et al. demonstrated a relationship between ballot length and expectations 
about how long it would take to vote.  In a simple analysis using their data, we were able to estimate that in 2008, 
each additional item on the ballot increased the time waiting to vote by about 13 seconds. See Herrnson and others. 
19 
 
One final comment is important here:  All of these policy proposals not only are offered under 
the proviso of “all things being equal,” they need to be kept in mind in light of budgetary and 
space constraints.  Most of these proposals would cost money, at a time when local governments 
are trying to find ways to economize.  (And, of course, election administration has rarely been a 
top priority for local government spending.)  Despite the strong desire to deal with the problem 
of long lines within the envelope of current government spending, it is hard to imagine how the 
most promising possibilities can be pursued without an infusion of at least some new money into 
election administration. 
 
Space is another constraint that is rarely highlighted, but in the context of trying to streamline 
operations, it could be critical.  Nearly all physical polling places are located in repurposed 
space.  According to the 2012 SPAE, 32% of Election Day voters voted in school buildings, 22% 
in churches, and 16% in community centers, with the remaining 30% of voters using a 
hodgepodge of police/fire stations, libraries, stores, and private residences; for early voting, 44% 
voted in government buildings such as court houses and city halls, 16% in libraries, and 14% in 
community centers.  The important thing to note is that these are not standardized spaces, and it 
may not be possible to configure many of them optimally to reduce service times. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The previous section reviews a list of the most common recommendations that have been 
proffered as solutions to the problem of long lines.  Unlike post-2000, where research using 
existing data established a clear pattern that relate the use of antiquated voting machines to 
increased “lost votes,” there is no single, high-impact solution to long lines that emerges from 
existing research — and certainly nothing that seems to apply everywhere. 
 
It seems undoubtedly true that, ceteris paribus, if a state or locality were to reduce the number of 
voters coming to polling places, increase the number of service points, and decrease transaction 
times, lines would be shortened.  However, the cost of these proposals is unknown, and more to 
the point, the effect of these proposals measured on a per-minute-reduced basis has yet to be 
quantified. 
 
Therefore, while there may be some consensus solutions to local and state problems with long 
lines, much work still needs to be done to establish a basis for making changes that may seem 
less obvious, or for understanding trade-offs across competing values.  We conclude this paper 
by making some observations about how the required fact base might be established, building off 
the evidence that already exists.   
 
1. The “line problem” consists of two parts, chronic long lines and long lines due to one-off 
events. 
 
2. Chronic long lines appear to beset only a handful of states and counties.  Research that 
compares states that are similar demographically, but which have significantly different 
average wait times, would advance our understanding of how laws and practices facilitate 
expeditious service at polling places.  Even in states with short average waiting periods, 
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urban areas can still have long lines.  Understanding the chronic challenges of urban 
areas appears to be a distinct area where more research is needed. 
 
3. All jurisdictions can be prone to emergencies that cause specific precincts to have long 
lines, and all jurisdictions could be helped by gaining access to better information about 
service times, to aid in a process of continued improvement.  The EAC and professional 
associations are well positioned to facilitate the sharing of best practices among election 
officials, as they cope with the inevitable service crises on Election Day.  The private and 
nonprofit sectors can be enlisted to develop tools that better capture customer service 
data, such as queue lengths, in real-time. 
 
4. The EAC can provide a helpful role in supporting the research on voters’ experiences and 
the extent and causes of line problems.  It is within the EAC’s mandate to report on the 
progress of state and local election officials in improving the customer service provided 
to voters in polling places, and to develop resources on the management of lines that can 
assist counties that have chronic line problems.  
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Appendix 1 
Average wait times by state, 2008 and 2012 
2008 2012 2008 2012 
State Wait 
95% 
m.o.e.a Wait 
95% 
m.o.e. a Wait 
95% 
m.o.e. a  Wait 
95% 
m.o.e. a 
Alabama 21 5.5 10 2.4 Montana 6 2.1 12 5.2 
Alaska 5 1.7 3 1.2 Nebraska 10 3.2 4 1.1 
Arizona 15 4.5 8 2.9 Nevada 10 2.4 8 1.3 
Arkansas 21 4.7 13 2.4 New Hampshire 6 1.7 11 2.2 
California 11 2.6 7 0.8 New Jersey 7 1.5 5 0.7 
Colorado 10 4.1 8 2.7 New Mexico 12 2.9 6 1.4 
Connecticut 10 23. 7 1.6 New York 9 1.3 12 1.5 
Delaware 12 3.2 4 1 North Carolina 19 2.9 13 1.4 
D.C. 28 9.8 37 7.5 North Dakota 5 1.9 10 7.5 
Florida 31 3.5 39 4 Ohio 19 2.7 10 1.3 
Georgia 40 5.8 16 2 Oklahoma 22 4.9 17 2.7 
Hawaii 5 1.6 7 2 Oregon na na na na 
Idaho 6 1.8 8 1.9 Pennsylvania 14 1.7 8 1 
Illinois 12 1.8 12 2.2 Rhode Island 5 2 11 2.2 
Indiana 22 3.6 13 2.3 South Carolina 56 7.7 25 3.8 
Iowa 5 1.5 6 1.8 South Dakota 4 1.7 3 1.2 
Kansas 10 2.3 11 2 Tennessee 19 3.6 13 1.7 
Kentucky 12 2.6 8 1.5 Texas 13 1.4 11 1.1 
Louisiana 16 3.5 16 3 Utah 13 3.3 10 2 
Maine 4 1.3 4 1.1 Vermont 2 1.2 2 0.7 
Maryland 24 4.3 36 4 Virginia 28 4.6 25 2.5 
Massachusetts 6 1.2 7 1.2 Washington na na na na 
Michigan 20 3.5 19 2.3 West Virginia 14 3.4 11 2 
Minnesota 9 2 6 1 Wisconsin 8 1.6 8 1.4 
Mississippi 11 2.9 7 1.4 Wyoming 5 2 4 1.2 
Missouri 20 3.7 11 1.8 
 
Oregon and Washington are excluded because they are vote-by-mail states. 
Source:  CCES and SPAE, 2008 and 2012.  
a Margin of error.  
22 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Multivariate Regression Predicting Wait Times in 2013 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Mode of voting 
(Election Day = comparison category) 
    
-Early voting 5.82*** 
(0.51) 
3.75*** 
(0.56) 
5.73*** 
(0.59) 
5.92*** 
(0.70) 
Race of voters 
(White = comparison category) 
    
-Black 9.53*** 
(0.64) 
7.06*** 
(0.63) 
4.99*** 
(0.67) 
0.82 
(0.87) 
-Hispanic 5.09*** 
(0.86) 
5.99*** 
(0.85) 
0.28 
(0.87) 
0.21 
(1.13) 
-Asian 0.76 
(1.56) 
2.28 
(1.50) 
2.19 
(1.50) 
4.20* 
(2.05) 
-Native American 3.09 
(2.38) 
3.51 
(2.28) 
2.62 
(2.57) 
2.25 
(3.33) 
-Mixed 0.42 
(1.60) 
0.28 
(1.53) 
0.66 
(1.51) 
2.06 
(1.81) 
-Other 3.90* 
(1.90) 
2.14 
(1.18) 
1.42 
(1.90) 
3.21 
(2.28) 
-Middle Eastern -3.01 
(4.41) 
0.08 
(4.24) 
1.19 
(4.08) 
2.29 
(5.92) 
     
log(ZIP Code density) 2.05*** 
(0.11) 
2.24*** 
(0.12) 
0.51* 
(0.22) 
— 
Intercept -2.91*** 
(0.79) 
-3.48*** 
(0.84) 
8.40*** 
(1.51) 
12.30 
(0.25) 
Fixed effects? None State County ZIP Code 
N 18,580 18,580 18,580 18,580 
R2 .05 .14 .33 .76 
 
*p < .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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